YELLOW MAN’S BURDEN: JAPANESE RACIAL ATTITUDES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN KOREA, CHINA, AND FORMOSA IN THE MEIJI AND TAISHO ERA

MICHAEL A. RENO

INTRODUCTION

The colonial invasion of Asia in the late nineteenth century by the industrial nations of the West undermined the political stability of Asia. The focal point of the colonial invasion was China. Long the dominant economic, cultural, and political power in the area, China’s autonomy gradually deteriorated under Western pressure. The “China question” affected not only China but also determined the destinies of Japan and Korea. Like China, Japan and Korea gave way to “gun-boat” diplomacy but ultimately responded differently to the West. While Korea sat helplessly in the midst of the scramble for Asia, Japan joined the Western nations in the quest for colonial supremacy in Asia.

This meeting between the technologically advanced Western nations and the previously isolated nations of Asia led the Western nations to view their own cultures as “superior” to the technologically “backward” Asian cultures. Assuming that the process of colonization would benefit the Asians, the Western powers accepted the notion of the “white man’s burden” to bring “civilization” to the Asians. Race relations between the colonial powers and the Asians reflected this political hegemony and led to the paternalistic attitude which would characterize Western foreign policy toward Asia.

But Japan’s modernization and industrialization program challenged Western hegemony and paternalism. Japan’s move from subordination to one of the industrial elite and to a position of colonial power in its own right challenged this fixed world-view and brought a great deal of resentment and criticism from the Western powers. Japan responded by producing an extensive body of literature defending itself. This paper will study that body of literature.

This analysis includes materials that range from the scholarly papers which appeared in George Blakeslee’s 1912 edition of essays concerning the commercial and political dimensions of Japanese-American relations to the Japan Society of America’s efforts to foster friendly relations between the two countries. My study also draws heavily on Kawakami Kiyoshi’s' frank apologia for Japanese expansionism and Takekoshi Yosaburo’s
inquiry into Japan's colonial experience in Formosa. The diplomatic memoirs of Ishii Kikuijirō and Count Hayashi, both of whom held prominent positions in the Japanese government, proved useful in determining the "official" attitudes and justifications while the politically moderate Japan Weekly Mail, an English language newspaper published in Yokohama for the international community, offered a surprisingly frank view of racial attitudes of the Japanese.

Although these sources represent a limited segment of the Japanese government and society, they offer an indication of some of the prevailing racial attitudes of the Japanese during the Meiji (1868-1912) and Taisho (1912-1926) eras. These sources suggest that Japan began its quest for colonies with the grand ideal of racial equality amongst all nations. But gradually, Western racial antagonisms toward Asian "backwardness" and the failure of China and Korea to follow Japan's advice led Japan to abandon a multilateral approach in favor of a unilateral approach against Western imperialism. Just as the West assumed the "white man's burden," Japan felt it had to assume the "yellow man's burden." This policy, however, was not the product of any strong feelings of racial superiority on the part of Japan. Rather it grew out of Japan's frustration over the refusal of China and Korea to follow Japan's example.

JAPAN AND THE WEST

From the beginning, Western racial prejudice forced the Japanese to think in racial terms. Confronted by the racist anti-Asian sentiment in the West, especially the United States, Japan found itself immediately on the defensive and began to articulate its objections to racial inequality. The words of Viscount Kaneko Kentaro, who held a variety of ministerial positions in the Japanese government, summed up Japan's call for universal racial equality. If Japan had only one thing to teach the West, Kaneko noted, "it is the fact that mankind is a one and indivisible whole, that the yellow race is not inferior to the white, that all the races should co-operate in perfect harmony for the development of the world's civilization." Similarly, the former Premier and Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu, responding to a European critic's claim that Japan was nothing but a nation of eclectics, proudly stated: "Fortunately, we are free from any racial or religious prejudices." Okuma then proceeded to protest anti-Japanese sentiment in America as "a bigotry that we must
combat and destroy through the fulfillment of our national mission.” Following Okuma’s reasoning, it should surprise no one that Japan, since it was the subject of the virulent racism of the West, would be one of the most vocal advocates of racial equality.

It would also be difficult to view the Japanese as an aggressive, brutally oppressive imperialist nation if one were to believe Asano Soichiro. A prominent businessman, Asano boldly claimed: “Imperialist expansion of territory is already a thing of the past. At present and in the future the development of civilized nations must be sought for along lines of communications, industry, and commerce, and in international trade.” But the most outstanding example of Japan’s racial egalitarianism came at the Versailles Peace Conference when Japan called for the inclusion of a clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations supporting racial equality, an initiative which the Western powers rejected.

At the same time, however, Japan noticed and admired the military and technological power of the West. While Japan rejected the racist arguments of the West, it accepted the logic of a hierarchy of nations. Ishii Kikujiro, Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1915-1916, framed Japan’s conception of the hierarchy of nations in his Diplomatic Commentaries. “Looking over the earth,” Ishii wrote, “we find major or lesser nations, semi-independent states and protectorates, ruling powers and ruled races. The present status of protected and ruled peoples is the penalty for their weakness and backwardness.” Ishii directed his paternalism toward the less developed countries whom he advised to patiently and with self-restraint await the realization of their hopes for autonomy and self-determination, in the meantime advancing in an orderly manner toward these states. The future of the world’s peace in fact depends upon the magnanimity of the advanced and the patience of the backward peoples.

In Ishii’s view, technologically less-developed nations could achieve equality in world affairs if they modernized and reformed themselves in the manner of Japan. Nations became legitimate when they proved their allegiance to “progress.” The Meiji Restoration of 1868 marked the beginning of Japan’s allegiance to the Western notions of progress. W.G. Beasley, in his study of Japanese imperialism, has shown that one of the immediate goals of the new government was to challenge the unequal treaties imposed upon Japan by the West. In order to do so, Japan had to gain the respect of the Western powers. Therefore, Japan adopted Western values in an attempt to gain this respect and ultimately to fend off the West’s surge into Asia. If the rest of Asia responded as Japan did, then the Asian nations could fend off Western imperialism as sovereign equals. However, if the other Asian nations failed to respond, then Japan would have to shoulder the burden alone. Initially preferring the first alternative, Japan gradually moved toward unilateral action. Japan’s relationship with Korea offers a perfect illustration of this transition in Japanese foreign policy.
The history of Japanese-Korean relations spans over 2000 years, but until the late nineteenth century, the contact between the two civilizations had been intermittent. Over the course of this long history, the countries have oscillated between the dominant and the subordinate. The first recorded episode took place in the third century B.C. when Jingu Kogo conquered the Korean peninsula. Centuries later, the Koreans played the role of “civilizer” by bringing continental civilization to Japan. And then in the late sixteenth century, Japan asserted its dominance when Toyotomi Hideyoshi conquered Korea only to have his superior, Tokugawa Ieyasu, restore peaceful relations. With the Seclusion Decree or “Sakoku-Rei” of 1636, Japan turned inward and lapsed into isolation. Nearly 230 years later, Japan once again took the initiative to reestablish relations with Korea and ushered in the modern era of formal Japanese-Korean relations with Japan playing the hegemonic role. Ever since, Japan’s relations with Korea have been punctuated with charges of racism and abuse. One Kibei, 10 recollecting his return to America after World War II, wrote, “Now I am proud to be an American citizen in a country where races are tolerated. In Japan they look down on the Koreans and Chinese.” 11

But the racial attitudes of the Japanese toward the Koreans have not always been so clearly defined. Post World War II racial attitudes in Asia continue to be shaped by the legacy of Japan’s ruthless and militaristic drive for a “New Order.” 12 But prior to World War I, Japanese-Korean racial attitudes lacked clear definition and the precise role that racial attitudes played in Japan’s foreign policy remains somewhat elusive. However, notions and sensitivities to inferiority did play a central role and hampered Japan’s early attempts to establish relations with Korea. For example, the Korean Emperor repeatedly rebuffed Japan’s efforts, according to W.G. Beasley, because “the Japanese used terminology which by implication likened their own ruler to China’s and relegated Korea’s to a lower place. The Koreans took offense at this and rejected the document.” 13 Outraged by the “haughty” and “insulting” behavior of the Koreans, some prominent Japanese, such as Foreign Minister Soyejima Taneomi, argued that force would be the only way to “open” Korea. However, after a heated debate of the Council of State in mid-October of 1873, the question was referred to the Emperor Meiji Tenno who decided against a retaliatory expedition.

But the Japanese continued to be perplexed and frustrated by Korea’s refusal to acknowledge Japan’s prestige and power. In 1875, the Koreans fired on the Japanese warship Unyo which “was engaged in soundings off the coast.” 14 Japan retaliated and forced Korea to accept the Kianghwa Treaty of 1876 which recognized Korea as “an independent
state” with “the same sovereign rights” as Japan. The motivation for this Japanese “aggression,” from the Japanese perspective, was the refusal of Korea to act realistically. By its refusal to seriously entertain Japan’s overtures, Korea affronted Japan’s sense of national honor. Japan saw this incident as typical of the “irresponsible” kind of diplomacy employed by Korea and China, which the Western powers had taken advantage of to establish themselves in Asia.

The implementation of the treaty produced a strong anti-Japanese response in Korea which alienated many Japanese and helped fuel growing Japanese feelings of superiority toward the Koreans. Ono Azusa, a leader of intellectual thought during the second decade of the Meiji era, reacting to anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea wrote: “I do not hate Koreans, but I feel sorry for their naiveté.”16 Ono’s statement perfectly illustrates Japan’s sense of having risen above the “backward” and “naive” condition of the Koreans. But from the Japanese point of view, Korea’s subordinate status was not the product of racial inferiority but was the result of Korea’s refusal to realistically assess the current world situation, characterized by an expanding Western colonial presence in Asia.

Japan’s concern over the presence of strong Western powers in Asia permeated Japan’s relationship with Korea. Faced with the encroaching colonialism of the West, Japan struggled to avoid the unhappy subordination of China and feared an outside power would intervene in Korea, which had historically been a “dagger” pointed at the heart of Japan. Korea had been the source of all past invasions either directly or indirectly. Thus Korea “was a constant thorn in the side of Japan.”16 In 1894, this concern contributed to the Sino-Japanese War. Japan’s decisive victory over China had profound implications for Japanese-Korean relations. The Treaty of Shimonoseki which ended the war stipulated that China withdraw its suzerainty over Korea. With its victory, Japan stepped up its efforts to convince the Koreans to reform their country in order to withstand Western imperialism.17

Japan’s fear of the growing Western colonial presence played a large role in determining Japan’s attitudes toward its neighbors. The Japanese hoped their victory over the Chinese would impress the West and spare Japan from the brunt of Western racist stereotypes. Western arrogance toward Asians troubled the Japanese, who did not want to be “unfairly” grouped with the Chinese and Koreans who perhaps deserved their subordinate status. As early as 1885, Fukuzawa Yukichi, a leading spokesman for his generation and proprietor of the influential newspaper Jiji Shimpo, lamented that Western “appraisals of China and Korea are applied to our country.” Therefore, in order to distinguish itself from China and Korea, Japan “should deal with them as Westerners do.”18 Yet, the idea that Japan intended to pursue discriminatory policies toward the supposed racially inferior
Koreans is wrong. In fact, Inoue Kaoru, who had twice served as Foreign Minister and had been sent as an envoy extraordinary to Korea, argued that Japan should not just consider its own interests in Korea but should “co-operate in the pursuit of common interests, neither robbing Korea of benefits, nor sacrificing our own.”19 Japan’s altruism does not preclude the fact that its expansionism, according to Akira Iriye, “manifested self-consciousness about civilization and race.”20 Tokutomi Soho, in the September 13, 1894 issue of Kokumin no tomo, illustrated Japan’s self-consciousness when he wrote that the war would “determine once and for all Japan’s position in the world... If our country achieves a brilliant victory, all previous misconceptions will be dispelled.”21

Japan’s defeat of China did not insure Japanese hegemony in Korea. The Tripartite Intervention of May 1895 by Russia, Germany and France “advised” Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria to China. Japan’s acquiescence revealed the power the West still held over Japan. In addition, the Russians made agreements with China and moved into both Manchuria and Korea. The Russian presence in Korea created tensions between Japan and Russia that ultimately led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Japan’s impressive victory over Russia allowed Japan to exercise a “free hand” in Korea, finally annexing the peninsula outright in 1910.

With the Russians ousted, Japan’s position in Korea was no longer militarily challenged, but it was subject to the most concentrated scrutiny. Critics charged Japan with treating the Koreans with roughness and violence. To ascertain the true extent that racial antagonism played in these abuses would be difficult, but the Japanese responses are illuminating. The moderate Japan Weekly Mail tried to place the blame for the abuses on the “low class Japanese” in Korea. The newspaper lamented that they “behave in a manner quite inconsistent with Japanese character, as we know it in Japan, and in a manner very much opposed to their own country’s best interest.”22 Months later, the Mail related a story which appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun in which “its argument is, in brief, that the Koreans having proved themselves children, must be treated as children and coerced where they cannot be persuaded.”23 One year later, the Mail would be expressing a similar point of view when it labelled Korea “the child of the Far East.”24

But the bulk of these feelings of Japanese superiority have little to do with race and more to do with Japan’s frustration with its failure to reform Korea. As early as 1901, Count Hayashi Tadasu, the Japanese Minister in London, expressed Japan’s frustration to England’s Lord Lansdowne during discussions pertaining to the proposed Anglo-Japanese alliance, remarking that it was “quite useless to attempt to hold a neutral position” with respect to the Koreans because they were “totally incapable of governing themselves.”25 And the Japan Weekly Mail noted that Japan’s attempts to peacefully win over the Koreans
was “a vain hope. Such procedure rates the Koreans too high.” Ironically, the Mail lamented the existence of Korean prejudice against the Japanese, because the Koreans could “not believe that the latter [the Japanese] have any position in the world. They cannot bring themselves to submit to the Japanese. On the contrary, they dislike them more and more. Anti-Japanese feeling is very old in Korea, and it is now almost universal.”

Japan had hoped that Korea would embrace Japan’s advice to reform. A reformed Korea would put a halt to the creeping Western influence and control of Asia. Kawakami Kiyoshi, who devoted an entire chapter in his book to debunking Japanese “outrages” in Korea, summed up Japan’s aspirations on the continent as an attempt “to bring her backward neighbors, China and Korea, into line with herself, so that the whole Orient might one day rise in one solid mass and declare to the tide of Western aggression: ‘Thus far shalt thou go and no further.’” It seems plausible to suggest that Japan decided to sacrifice Korean independence and sovereignty for the “greater good” of defending the Asian race against Western hegemony. Japan also employed this logic to justify its growing presence in Manchuria.

**JAPAN IN CHINA**

The Sino-Japanese relationship during this period can best be classified as a love-hate relationship. Although deeply concerned about the deterioration in China due to Western pressure, Japan nevertheless contributed to it by going to war with China. The terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which pushed China out of Korea, and the gains Japan made in Manchuria as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, certainly did not add to China’s stability as an independent nation. In addition, China became the playing field where Japan challenged Western hegemony in Asia. Like Korea, Japan gradually viewed China as a lost cause and felt that only by direct intervention could it achieve its goals. However, China refused to “cooperate” and continued to resist and obstruct Japan’s efforts which only increased Japan’s contempt for Chinese “arrogance.” Again, it was not that China was racially inferior to Japan: China, like Korea, was contemptible because it had behaved irresponsibly. Its continued mismanagement and ridiculous attempts to play one Western
nation of another had eroded all traces of its national dignity and sovereignty. Thus, Japan felt that China had become an embarrassment to Asia and should have had no objection to Japan's program of reform in Manchuria.29

Japan was not immediately comfortable with its increasingly aggressive intervention in China. Recognizing the debt its civilization owed to China, many in Japan continued to pay deference to China.30 Many felt that Japan had an obligation to repay its cultural debt to China by protecting it in its time of trouble. Hayashi, recalling Japanese injustices to Chinese committed after the Russo-Japanese War, warned against conceit on the part of the political and military establishment of Japan toward the Chinese. "But if the Japanese will only strip off their gold braid," Hayashi wrote, "they will find that they have left only that which they have imported originally from China, and consequently it is clear that they are behind the Chinese in every point of civilization."31 Despite China's refusal to cooperate with Japan, Hayashi argued that "it would be useless for us to attempt the policy of 'bamboozle,' which can only be done in the case of uncivilized barbarians. To adopt such a policy towards China would be the height of insult to the intelligence of a nation which stands on equal terms with us."32

Despite Hayashi's insistence that China was the equal of any nation, Japan went out of its way to avoid being compared to the Chinese. Denton Snider, commenting on his experience at the World's Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago, noted that "one cannot help noticing here the care with which the Japanese man explains that he is not a China man."33 And Muto Sanji, author of Beikoku iuron (On Emigration to the United States) argued that there was no reason why the Japanese could not imitate the "successes" of the Chinese immigrants because he "was confident that the superiority of Japanese to Chinese was well-recognized by Westerners."34 In addition, Takamine Jokichi, in his description of the Japanese in America, proudly pointed out that while the Chinese in America lived in Chinatowns due to their inability to assimilate, "there is in no Occidental city a Japantown as there is a Chinatown."35 Japan's careful avoidance of being compared to the Chinese conflicted with Japan's long time admiration for Chinese civilization. This psychological conflict caused a great deal of confusion as Japan felt split between its historical identification with China and its newly acquired admiration for the West.

The older deference to China continued in Japanese protestations against Western racial prejudice toward the Chinese. Okuma Shigenobu tried to debunk Chinese racial inferiority by suggesting that its political subordination to the West was not because "the Chinese are essentially inferior to the European race," but rather "due to the fact that they did not strive to adapt themselves to the civilization of the outside world."36 The abusive treatment accorded to Chinese immigrants in America also disturbed the Japanese, who
feared similar treatment. The *Japan Weekly Mail* complained of American anti-Chinese feelings as "one of the bitterest insults that could be put upon any people, above all on a people who, taken en masse, are not inferior in civilization to any nation in the world and are manifestly superior to many."\(^{37}\)

China had little use for such defenses or for Japanese hegemony and continued its policy of trying to use Western influence to check Japanese advances. For many Chinese, the key to maintaining any integrity at all was to create as much chaos as possible leaving the foreigners to fight amongst themselves. The *Japan Weekly Mail* asserted that "in Manchuria especially she [China] is obstructive to the extent of being vexatious. Her method is to accumulate a long catalogue of unsettled questions, apparently in the hope that Japan, through sheer weariness of unproductive effort, will give in at last."\(^{38}\) In fact, when Japan gradually replaced the Western powers, China moved to reassert control by initiating what became known as the "rights recovery campaign."

China’s desire resulted from its long history of dominance over Japan. The idea that Japan enjoyed greater prestige than China was incomprehensible to the Chinese. Japan, however, gradually outgrew its awkwardness and began to accept its ascendancy, seeing its growing presence in China as legitimate. Beginning with its military victory over China in 1895, Japan "had amply demonstrated her prowess in arms and rightly won her place in China on an equal basis with the other Powers."\(^{39}\) In addition, Japan’s role in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 furthered its identification with the West. After Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905, a general feeling developed in Japan that any hope for cooperation with China was useless, and Japan began to assert a stronger presence in Manchuria. As in Korea, the waves of anti-Japanese sentiment which rocked China confused Japan. The *Japan Weekly Mail*, commenting on the "rights recovery campaign," argued quite realistically that since China had forfeited its rights to the Western powers, it had not exercised any "rights" for a long time. To suddenly object to Japanese control was not only unfair but insulting because it failed to acknowledge the strength and power of Japan.\(^{40}\)

Kawakami Kiyoshi articulated Japan’s grievance against China’s “ungrateful” attitude years later in his apologia for Japanese expansion, by noting that in fighting the war against Russia, Japan “had fought China’s battle as much as she had fought her own, sacrificing countless lives and spending hundreds of millions of dollars…. [H]ad not the doughty islanders taken arms against the Northern Colossus, Manchuria…would have been permanently lost to China.”\(^{41}\)

Thus, while Japan’s perceptions of China started out deferentially acknowledging China’s territorial integrity, Japan became increasingly distressed with the Western colonial presence in China and with the anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States.
Witnessing the dissolution of China's territorial integrity and international reputation, Japan began its program to insure a sphere of influence in China. Gradually moving from the original plan of bilateral cooperation with China, Japan saw itself as having to take up the "yellow man's burden" to resurrect a dying China and maintain a strong Asian presence there.42

**JAPAN IN FORMOSA**

Japan's colonial aspirations encompassed more than just China and Korea. Japan had exercised a strong colonial presence in Formosa (Taiwan) for years.43 This presence was quite different from that in Korea or Manchuria. Takekoshi Yosaburo, a member of the Japanese Diet, attempted to chronicle the Japanese experience in Formosa. Takekoshi hoped to dismiss doubts within Japan about its ability to be a colonial power. His treatise, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, unabashedly revealed Japan's attitude toward the natives of the island. Like most technologically advanced societies which encountered pre-industrial societies, the Japanese quickly labelled the inhabitants as "savages" and "barbarians."

Yet, Japan's paternalist attitude toward the Formosans did not necessarily lead to Japanese oppression of the islanders. In fact, Takekoshi was surprisingly ready to claim the Formosan "savages" as long lost brothers. Commenting on the origins of the Formosans, he noted that

> there seems to be a consensus of opinion among scholars that most of the tribes are of Malayan origin. Though not qualified to pronounce an authoritative opinion upon this subject, I entertain a firm conviction that our Japanese ancestors and these savages are in some way blood relations.44

As for the future prospects, Takekoshi noted with hope that "some people say they are quite capable of being trained and civilised."45 And Nitobe Inazo, a former director of the Bureau of Industries in Formosa, felt that although the "indigenous population consists of head-hunters of Malay descent" who were living "in a very low grade of culture," there was reason to be optimistic because "these people are very cleanly in their habits" and "they keep their cottages perfectly clean, unlike other savages of a similar grade of culture."46
Takekoshi also called for some flexibility and leniency in governing the Formosans. He advised that “we must govern the Formosans not as we do the Japanese, but as we should the Formosans. We should not necessarily forbid the tying of the feet, nor should we compel the men of Formosa to cut off their queues.”47 But Takekoshi’s cautious reservations about destroying the social fabric of native customs had its limits. The folkways and traditions of the Formosans could be tolerated only so long as they did not interfere with Japan’s colonial goals, for “the economic development of the island cannot be stopped for ever on account of a few thousand savages.”48 Despite Takekoshi’s reservations on the role of militarism in colonizing, Japan carried out a determined campaign to subdue the natives by forming “a cordon” around “the savages” and slowly pushed them into a smaller area.49 But the Japanese did so, according to the Japan Weekly Mail, “with a minimum of bloodshed by giving the various tribes ample opportunity to surrender, and also at a minimum of cost.”50 In May of 1907, the Mail reported that: “It is evident that General Sakuma, Viceroy of Formosa, is convinced that only by the stronghand can these uncivilized tribes be brought into complete subjection.”51

Japan’s goal in Formosa was not only to extend “to the inhabitants the benefits of civilisation [sic],”52 but also to take the initial step into the world of colonial power. Like the Western powers, the Japanese were interested in the economic benefit of colonies, but they also desired to serve notice to the West that they would have a say in what was going to take place in Asia. Japan could “point to her successes thus far in Formosa as proof of her worthiness to be admitted into the community of the world’s great colonial powers.”53 Japan had every right to do as they pleased in Formosa, because “when Spain took possession of the Philippines she could proceed to civilize them in her own way without consulting the views of the Filipinos themselves. So it is with the Japanese in Formosa.”54

Conclusion

One of the primary goals of Japan during the Meiji era was to redress the unequal relationship between Japan and the West. Once accomplished, Japan began to look for ways to correct the imbalance between the rest of Asia and the West. Initially, Japan tried to work with the traditional governments of Korea and China, but when the results proved unsatisfactory, Japan assumed “the yellow man’s burden” and began to employ more
drastic measures to insure Korean and Chinese cooperation. In the process, Japan found itself confronted by its traditional notions of a hierarchy of nations. Subject to racial prejudice from the West and confronted with its own contempt for "backward" Chinese and Koreans and the "savage" Formosans, Japan attempted to resolve the tension between its desire for racial equality and its growing feelings of superiority.

Japan's colonial drive during the Meiji and Taisho eras was not fueled primarily by feelings of racial superiority. Rather, it was Japan's growing frustration over China and Korea's refusal to cooperate with Japan and its efforts to push the Western powers out of Asia that led Japan to undertake unilateral action in Asia. The documents examined in this study illustrate the diversity and often contradictory nature of Japanese racial attitudes. Moreover, many of Japan's leading officials were troubled by the potential poisonous influence of racism, and they hoped to create an Asia free from the racist hegemony of the West. However, the hope of multilateral cooperation among Asian nations vanished in the militarism and hypernationalism of the "third generation" whose leaders guided their nation down the path of war and ultimately to their own destruction.
NOTES

1 For purposes of authenticity, I have employed the traditional Japanese style of placing the family name before the given name. However, I have used the Western style in all citations to achieve uniformity with Western authors.


3 Shigenobu Okuma, “Our National Mission,” in Japan to America, 4-5.

4 Soichiro Asano, “Future of the Pacific and the American-Japanese Friendship,” in Japan to America, 43. Asano served as President of the Oriental Steamship Company and the Asano Cement Company.


8 Ibid., 316.


10 A Kibei is a Japanese who was born in the United States, returned to Japan, and then returned to the United States.

11 Quoted in Don Toshiaki Nakunishi, “The Visual Panacea,” in Mutual Images, op. cit., 239. This person obviously was unaware of the internment of Japanese-Americans during the war and the long history of racism in the United States.


13 Beasley, op. cit., 43.


16 Akagi, op. cit., 113; Ishii, op. cit., 10.


23 Ibid., 28 October 1905, 468.

24 Ibid., 26 January 1907, 79.


26 *Japan Weekly Mail*, March 30, 1907, 333. The article continues by recounting the story of a Korean envoy reporting to the Korean Emperor about his trip to Japan. The envoy noted that Japan was further ahead of Korea in most areas, but "that in Korea the railways had a wider gage and the carts were larger. The Emperor was much gratified by these evidences of superiority. His majesty did not pause to think who had built the railways. That is the kind of silliness which obtains vogue."

27 Generally the criticisms dealt with economics and the West's, especially the United States' fear that it was being pushed out of the Korean market.


32 Ibid., 273.


34 This quote comes from the paraphrase by Akira Iriye in *Pacific Estrangement*, 23.


36 Okuma, "Our National Mission" in *Japan to America*, 4. Okuma attributes China's failure to adapt to the times to China's "narrow provincialism."

37 *Japan Weekly Mail*, 10 June, 1905, 625.

38 Ibid., 18 January, 1907, 56.


40 *Japan Weekly Mail*, 12 January, 1907, 31.

This policy was also known as the “Okuma doctrine.” See Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, ed. The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), xxvi.

Japan had acquired Formosa as one of the provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. I have decided to refer to Taiwan as Formosa for purposes of uniformity.


Ibid., 229.


Takekoshi, “Japan's Colonial Policy” in Japan to America, 97.

Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, 212.

Takekoshi claimed that “nations cannot maintain their existence by military power alone. In fact, military power has brought misfortune upon many a country, because the commensurate administrative skill and national spirit were subsequently found to be lacking.” Ibid., 1-2.

Japan Weekly Mail, 19 January, 1907, 52.

Ibid., 4 May, 1907, 475.


Ibid., 2.

Japan Weekly Mail, 9 February, 1907, 139.
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