

Dispelling A Myth: The Soviet Note of March 1952

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On March 10, 1952, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, sent to the delegates of the three Western occupying powers of Germany diplomatic correspondence which included a draft peace treaty for Germany.¹ The provisions outlined in this Soviet diplomatic note were sweeping. According to the Soviet note, Germany would be reunified, thus ending its aberrant division, and given an opportunity to establish itself as an independent, democratic, peace-loving state. In addition, all democratic parties and organizations in Germany would have free activity, including the right to assembly, free speech, and publication. The Soviet note also provided civil and political rights for all German citizens; this included all former members of the German *Wehrmacht*, and all former Nazis, excluding those serving court sentences for crimes against humanity. The Soviet draft peace treaty called for the withdrawal of all armed forces of the occupying powers, mandated the liquidation of all foreign bases of operation within Germany, and prevented reunited Germany from joining any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the Second World War against Germany. Germany's territories were defined, according to the Soviet diplomatic note, by the borders provided by the provisions of the Potsdam conference. Furthermore, the Soviet draft peace treaty allowed Germany to develop its own national armed forces (land, sea, and air) necessary to provide for the defense of the country and permitted the formation of a German arms industry, limited by the provisions provided in the final German peace treaty.²

The Soviets hoped to convene a four power conference designed to make peace with a united German state. The four power conference envisioned by the Kremlin never took place. Instead, the Russian initiative led to an exchange of diplomatic correspondence between the Soviet Union and the three Western occupying powers that continued throughout the summer of 1952. This "battle of the notes," as British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden termed it, revealed that the Soviets and the West held widely differing views regarding the necessity of free, all-German elections preceding any discussion relating to the reunification of Germany. The "battle of the notes" left unanswered important issues of the Soviet note of March 1952; the Soviets proposed no specific limits for German remilitarization and offered no definition as to what constituted a democratic, peace-loving, and independent state. At the end of the summer of 1952, Soviet attempts to resolve the German question would not achieve success; Germany would remain divided and each section would become more firmly anchored in its respective bloc over the next three and a half decades.

Were the Soviets offering a sincere path toward German reunification? Were they ready to allow the formation of a united, armed, but neutral Germany? Would they have sacrificed hard-won war-time territorial gains in East Germany to prevent the integration of West Germany into an anti-Soviet Western European military alliance? These questions have engendered a belief that West German, Western European, and American leaders lost a unique opportunity to change the intensity of military, ideological, diplomatic, and economic competition between the West and East.

The assertion that Western leaders lost an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviets over Germany has also framed "one of the most intense controversies in Cold War historiography."³ Almost without exception, historians have separated into two camps. Each of these groups' findings stand in marked contrast to the other, due largely to differences in foci and access to important documents. Some scholars claim that the West missed a truly important opportunity to change the history of the Cold War in Europe, because Stalin and the Soviets were sincerely

interested in negotiating over the future of Germany with their March 1952 note. The second group of historians assert that there was no missed opportunity. These scholars maintain that the Soviet note was intended to influence public opinion in the West, most notably in West Germany, in an attempt to delay or derail West German integration into the European Defense Community and to arrest the process of economic and political integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe. The sincerity of the Soviet note is called into question by these scholars. They see the Germany that Stalin envisioned, one over which the Soviets would exercise significant control, as being unacceptable to the West. The West envisioned a Germany able to contribute to an anti-Soviet front and aid in the economic and military recovery of an integrated Western Europe, policies that were anathema to Soviet leadership, which viewed such initiatives as resuscitating German militarism.

Rolf Steininger's *The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification* stands as a deftly written example of scholarship which asserts that the Soviet note was sincere and that the West missed an opportunity to change the history of the Cold War in Europe. Paying particular attention to American and British documents released in the early 1980s, Steininger illuminates how the Soviet note was received by West German, French, British, and American diplomats. Steininger claims that in deference to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Western diplomats engaged the Soviets in a battle of the notes, designed largely to help Adenauer win West German public support for Western integration, while also providing him with the means to parry sharp domestic political criticism which claimed that he had abandoned the goal of German reunification. Steininger claims that the Soviet proposal outlined in the note was ultimately considered by Western leaders as too dangerous; they did not want a neutralized, unified, rearmed Germany, able to play East and West against one another and viewed the prospect as an unpleasant return to the days of Rapallo and the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Stalin, according to Steininger, would have sacrificed the East German Communists so as to bring about a Germany ruled by a government friendly to the West, but containing a strong leftist opposition, as in Italy. It is from this understanding of Western and Soviet interests that Steininger maintains that the Soviet note represented a sincere offer. "Stalin was prepared to agree to German reunification in the spring of 1952... a chance existed for reunification."⁴ According to Steininger, the missed opportunity for German reunification condemned eighteen million East Germans to nearly a half century of Soviet and East German governmental repression and left unsettled the question of German national identity.

Ann Phillips's *Soviet Policy Toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade* largely supports Steininger's claims regarding the idea of a missed opportunity, contending that the Soviet note was sincere and represented a real opportunity to negotiate German reunification. The Soviet note, according to Phillips, was an attempt to arrest West German integration into an anti-Soviet military alliance and to resolve the German question on terms compatible with Soviet foreign policy interests. Stalin, according to Phillips, believed that capitalism had entered into a deepening general crisis due to shrinking international markets that would lead eventually to war among the capitalist nations. The Soviet note of March 1952 was designed to reduce the tensions between the Soviets and the West, while fostering the disruption of friendly relations among capitalist nations. Phillips views the Soviet note as far reaching and sincere, citing the willingness of the Soviets to concede the previously unacceptable formation of a rearmed but neutral Germany, allowing even for the rehabilitation of members of the German army and former Nazis, excluding those convicted of war crimes. Phillips asserts that after the West's rejection of the Soviet note, Stalin sought to consolidate his position in the GDR, in part to prevent the eventuality of a reunited Germany joining an anti-Soviet alliance. Phillips contends that Stalin preferred a reunited neutral Germany which would grow in strength, exacerbate tensions among capitalist countries, and prohibit the formation of a united capitalist front against the USSR. Stalin, according to Phillips, pursued the less desirable option of consolidation,

which marked a major policy shift from ambivalence to support in Soviet foreign policy regarding the GDR.⁵

James Richardson, in *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance*, belongs to the group of scholars who refute the notion that the West missed an opportunity to change the history of the Cold War in Europe. Richardson maintains that the political conditions of post-war Europe precluded an agreement between the West and the Soviets over a reunified Germany. Richardson argues that had West Germany seriously supported negotiations with the Soviets over German reunification, it would lose the hard-won respect and support of the West, could become economically, militarily, and politically isolated, and would expose itself to the enormous pressure from the Soviets who already occupied one third of German territory. Richardson contends that the Soviets would have tolerated a united Germany only if they could gain a position to exercise influence over its internal policies or if the United States withdrew all of its military forces from Europe. Neither of these options were viable to Western leaders. In addition, the West could not have abided conditions which would have potentially interfered with the development of closer economic, and later political, relations between Germany and Western Europe, around which Western European recovery was envisioned. The Soviet note contained nothing that would have suggested they were willing to assent to these important Western concerns regarding a reunified Germany. The West focused correctly, Richardson argues, on the conditions which at the time were accorded the higher priority, namely West German integration into the EDC. Richardson believes that the Soviet offer was sincere, in that it offered an opportunity to create a unified Germany. However, the Soviet vision of a unified and neutral Germany was intolerable to Western leaders, thus preventing a resolution to the German question which was sufficiently palatable to all parties. Richardson agrees with Steininger that the West was unwilling to risk West German integration into an anti-Soviet alliance because of the shadow of reunification, but dissents from Steininger by maintaining that there was no lost opportunity. No Western leader, within the context of 1952 Europe, was willing to gamble on the future of a reunified and independent Germany.⁶

In *We Now Know*, John Lewis Gaddis argues that the Soviet note did not represent a meaningful opportunity to change the history of the Cold War in Europe. With the Soviet note, the USSR intended to retard and, if possible, prevent West German integration into the EDC by splitting public opinion in West Germany. By providing support to Adenauer's domestic critics, particularly the SPD, the Soviets hoped that domestic political strife in West Germany would topple the Adenauer government.⁷ Gaddis asserts that there was little interest from Western leaders to explore the offer outlined in the Soviet note. The Soviet note arrived weeks before the Bonn and Paris treaties were signed. From the perspective of Western leaders, the Soviet note seemed designed to delay the primary American and Western European foreign policy goal in Europe, the speedy construction of an integrated Western Europe with West Germans contributing mightily to the military strength of EDC and to Europe's economic recovery. Like Richardson, Gaddis contends there was no missed opportunity. Gaddis maintains that the Soviet note was an insincere offer; Stalin only allowed the Soviet note to be sent when he was guaranteed by a Soviet diplomat that the Americans would reject the offer to negotiate for a unified Germany. Gaddis claims that the Soviet position with regard to Germany rested on the belief that "only a Germany under Moscow's control could, with any reliability, ensure the Soviet Union's safety."⁸ The Soviet note represented one of Stalin's last hopes of creating by popular consent and without war a unified and Moscow-friendly Germany. However, due to the West's continued advance toward Western integration, Stalin decided to consolidate the Soviet position in East Germany and incorporate it into the Soviet bloc. The Soviets and Western leaders decided before the Soviet note that their respective foreign policy interests were best served by the continued division of Germany.

This essay seeks to evaluate the two central questions of this on going and controversial historiographical debate: was there a missed opportunity for German reunification almost forty

years before it actually occurred and was the Soviet note a sincere offer for a comprehensive peace treaty creating a neutral, unified, and remilitarized Germany? Related to these two central questions, this essay will also explore Soviet willingness to abandon the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in exchange for a neutral, independent, unaligned Germany. Important to this historiographical debate, is an assessment of whether conditions obtained in 1952 in which a solution to the German question could be found that was sufficiently palatable to all interested parties. The answer to this question requires some consideration as to what a reunified, neutral, remilitarized Germany would look like in the heart of Cold War Europe. It also requires an examination of the attitudes of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France toward German reunification in 1952.

An examination of recent monographic studies, newly published articles in academic journals, working papers published by the CWIHP, and translation of important documents by an active trans-Atlantic scholarly community strongly supports the claim that the Soviet note of 1952 did not represent a missed opportunity for German reunification. The Soviet government, and Stalin in particular, only allowed the March 10 note to be sent after receiving assurance that the Western occupying powers of Germany would reject it. Gaddis is correct to claim that the Soviet note represented an attempt to influence public opinion in the West, most notably in West Germany, in order to delay or derail West German integration into the European Defense Community (EDC), specifically, and to arrest the process of economic and political integration of Western Europe, including the Bonn republic, more generally. The Soviet note was not written to offer a sincere opportunity for German reunification, but rather to destabilize the domestic political situation in the Federal Republic, to topple the Adenauer government, and further complicate and impede the Western integration process. The most recent scholarship on Soviet foreign policy during this period, when combined with new research into the archives of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Berlin, strongly support the claim that the Soviet Union did not contemplate sacrificing the GDR in an attempt to bring about unification. The SED figured prominently into the Soviet vision of what a reunified, Moscow-friendly Germany would look like. By 1952, Soviet foreign policy and the foreign policies of the Western powers had developed around the belief that Germany would remain divided, thereby refuting the claims of scholars, like Steininger, who believe that conditions obtained in Cold War Europe that could have been exploited to bring about a peaceful and mutually palatable solution to the German problem.

New evidence taken from the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry reveals that the Soviet note of March 1952 had a prehistory dating back to February 1951. The head of the third European department, M. Gribanov, suggested to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that provisions for a peace treaty with Germany be prepared, which would permit the Soviet delegation to argue more forcefully over German affairs at the future conference of foreign ministers.⁹ Soviet stalling tactics at the preparatory meetings for the foreign ministers conference prevented the foreign ministers from meeting in spring 1951. The idea for a peace settlement lay dormant until the summer of 1951, when Gribanov suggested to Gromyko that the principles for a peace treaty with Germany be created to counter Allied plans to terminate West Germany's occupation status and integrate the country into the EDC.¹⁰ According to Ruud Van Dijk, "Gribanov did not argue that the Soviet Union seek constructive talks with the West, but rather advocated a propaganda move against the West."¹¹ Gribanov suggested that the leadership of the GDR propose to Bonn that a joint committee be appointed to draft an appeal to the governments of the occupying powers entreating them to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.¹² The leadership of the Bonn republic, the Soviets thought, would reject this proposal. The government of the GDR would then alone request that the four occupying powers meet to discuss a peace treaty, claiming that it alone was the sole guardian of German unity and honor. In response to the GDR's request, the Soviet government would, according to German historian Gerhard Wettig,

"then come out with its intended initiative and send a note to the three Western governments to which principles for the prospective peace treaty with Germany would be added."¹³

A committee was formed, in September 1951, that created a draft of the principles for a peace treaty with Germany. In mid-September 1951, the committee submitted the draft for review by Stalin, who approved, but decided that September 1951 was an inauspicious time to implement the plan. Gromyko suggested to Stalin that mid-January 1952 was the appropriate time to set the plan in motion, in order to sustain the momentum gained by the East German proposal for all German elections. Stalin approved the implementation of the plan on February 6, 1952. The government of the GDR transmitted identical notes to the four occupying powers on February 13 requesting the prompt conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.¹⁴ Wetzig claims:

From then on, everything went according to the fixed schedule. Within a week, Moscow answered that it agreed with the East German government and supported its initiative. Less than three weeks later, on 10 March 1952, the Soviet note... [was] sent to the Western governments and made public.¹⁵

The evidence available from the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry clearly reveal that the Soviets had little intent to elicit positive response among Western governments. Stalin only agreed to allow the note to be sent, according to Soviet diplomat Vladimir Semenov, after receiving assurance that the note would be turned down by the governments of the Western powers.¹⁶ According to Wetzig, "a positive response by Western governments was never discussed as an objective to the attainment of which efforts had to be made. It was the general public, particularly in Germany, to whom the message was directed."¹⁷ Wetzig's claim that the Soviet note was aimed at the West German public is further supported by the fact that the Soviet note was made public at the same time it was sent to the four occupying powers of Germany, a highly unusual move which jeopardized traditional diplomatic confidentiality.

Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko claimed that Soviet note would have "great political importance for strengthening the struggle for peace and against remilitarization of West Germany," since it would "help the advocates of Germany's unity and of peace to unmask the three Western powers' aggressive intentions that are connected to the 'General Treaty.'"¹⁸ The initiative was intended to mobilize the German masses, particularly in the Federal Republic, behind the West German Communist party (KPD), which was under Soviet and GDR control, in an effort to disrupt West German domestic politics and oust the Adenauer government. According to Soviet foreign policy makers, the German imperialist bourgeoisie had intimidated the German masses into believing that only through closer military, political, and economic alliance with the West would German reunification come about; the Soviets felt that this intimidation prevented the German masses from speaking out against the remilitarization of the West Germany.¹⁹ In April 1952, West German officials learned from the recently defected spokesman for East German Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger, Gerald Rummier, that the Soviet envoy to East Berlin, Georgy Pushkin, had told Dertinger that the Stalin note "was only a propaganda offensive" and that since West German integration into the EDC was a foregone conclusion, "the note's only practical goal was bringing down the present Bonn government."²⁰ In short, the Soviet note was conceived as a weapon with which the Soviets could more effectively wage the Cold War.

Another key question related to scholarly assessment of the Soviet note has been the degree to which historians believe Stalin was willing to sacrifice the GDR in order to attain a reunified, neutral Germany. Steinger contends that the GDR "had turned into a burdensome mortgage for the Kremlin."²¹ Wilfried Loth claims that "sacrificing SED (Social Unity Party) control of the GDR might seem a reasonable price to pay to prevent the West's superiority in the Cold War."²² Gaddis maintains that had there been any opportunity to bring about a reunified,

neutral, Moscow-friendly Germany in 1952, "the East German communists surely would have been expendable."²³

These scholarly claims imply a disparity that did not exist to Soviet foreign policy makers in 1952. The Soviets did not view the German situation in 1952 as a choice between retaining the SED or achieving German unity. As will be expanded upon below, the Soviets sought to organize through their clients in the German Communist Party (KPD) a Soviet future for all Germans.²⁴ According to Richard Raack, "the Kremlin as well as its SED dependents in East Berlin, did not see the issue in terms of an inevitable give and take. The way they hoped to bring about reunification was through an arrangement in which the SED power would be preserved and ultimately extended over all of Germany."²⁵ The archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the central archives of the SED clearly show that Moscow did not contemplate sacrificing the GDR in 1952 in order to bring about a united Germany.

Soviet foreign policy since 1945 strongly supported the actions of the newly formed KPD, and later communist-dominated SED. The Soviets viewed the SED efforts as central to attaining Soviet security in central Europe, and believed the SED crucial in realizing the Soviet vision of post-war Germany. In 1945, Stalin believed that there would be two Germanies: one progressive, the other reactionary. Though this does not imply that Stalin was considering a geographical border in 1945, it does indicate that Stalin viewed the world in terms of two ideological camps, the progressive forces of democracy and antifascism represented by the Soviet Union, and the reactionary and imperialist forces of the West headed by the United States.²⁶ The KPD was to bring about the unity of political forces in the Soviet Zone, and from there, reach out to influence the affairs in the western zone of Germany. According to Raack, "implicit was Stalin's determination that the ultimately unified Germany be effectively controlled through the Moscow-directed KPD."²⁷

With the formation of the SED in April 1946, Stalin wanted the SED leadership to pursue a "zigzag" and "opportunistic" path to socialism, one which allowed the Soviets to retain firm control over the eastern section while also giving the appearance to the West that the Soviet zone was not being transformed into a "peoples democracy." Thus, negotiation, on Soviet terms, was still possible.²⁸ According to Norman Naimark, "from the summer of 1947 until the formation of the GDR in October 1949, the Soviets began to think of the Eastern zone as part and parcel of their empire in Eastern Europe."²⁹ During this period, Soviet foreign policy endeavored to consolidate communist rule in the East, while trying to thwart the formation of a West German state. Soviet foreign policy in East Germany up through 1952 centered on the SED and their ability to gradually transform the Soviet zone into a peaceful, antifascist, democratic republic that loyally adhered to Soviet dictates. Though scholars have argued that Soviet foreign policy in the post-war period was subject to Stalin's sudden about-faces, Soviet foreign policy in their zone of occupation was firmly committed to maintaining KPD, and later SED, strength as a means of attaining Soviet geopolitical and security goals in Central Europe.

The Soviet note could have represented a true crisis situation for the leadership of the GDR, had the Soviet note been a sincere offer to negotiate on the future of a reunited Germany. In fact, the opposite was true; the Soviets relied on the SED leadership in the formation of their plan to propose talks aimed at reuniting Germany. The third European division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry requested that the SED leadership come up with a proposal on reunifying Germany. In February 1951, Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, and Otto Grotewohl created a proposal requesting a four power conference to discuss a peace treaty for Germany. According to Wettig, "contrary to what would have to be expected if there had been a risk involved regarding their power, they were not in the least reluctant."³⁰ The Soviets would respond to the East German request and submit a note to the three Western occupying powers calling for a discussion aimed at creating a peace treaty for Germany. In creating the proposal for the draft of principles for a peace treaty, Vojtech Mastny claims that Soviet diplomats "took it for granted that its preparation must not entail any weakening, much less a sacrifice, of the East German

state."³¹ The East Germans followed Soviet directives in beginning a press campaign aimed at strengthening the movement for restoring the unity of Germany and bringing about, according to Wettig, a "new stage in the struggle of the German people for the liquidation of the existing split of Germany."³² After March 1952, Dietrich Staritz contends that the leadership of the GDR did not "show much concern about retaining power. The fronts of the Cold War seemed too firmly fixed, and the efforts in the West to complete the EDC project, and with it the integration of the Federal Republic, too obvious, for there to be any basis for direct existential fears."³³

The SED leadership was in Moscow at the end of March 1952 for meetings with the Politburo members and Stalin. They were informed by Stalin that the Soviet Union was not preparing for an East-West compromise in the German question. According to Staritz, Stalin "seemed to count much more on the fact that the West would refuse his offer."³⁴ Stalin informed the SED leadership that the "pacifist period" was over and their efforts should be directed to the development of the GDR into a bulwark. Stalin informed the GDR hierarchs:

Irrespective of any proposals that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. It is a mistake to think that a compromise might emerge or that the Americans will agree with the draft of the peace treaty. The Americans need their army in West Germany to hold Western Europe in their hands. The real goal of this army is to control Europe. You must organize your own state. The line of demarcation between East and West Germany must be seen as a frontier and not as a simple border but a dangerous one. One must strengthen this frontier.³⁵

Stalin advised the SED leadership that they should continue with their "zigzag" policy toward socialism, informing them that they should create farmer cooperatives. According to notes taken by SED leader Wilhelm Pieck, Stalin advised the SED, "don't scream Kolchosen [Soviet collective farms], socialism, create the facts. In the beginning is the deed."³⁶ Though social, political, and ideological integration into the Soviet bloc would be postponed further, Staritz claims that the leadership of the SED learned from Stalin that the GDR would become more militarily integrated into the Soviet bloc with the "expansion of the East German armed forces up to 58,000 men, including infantry, marine, air force, armed artillery, and submarines."³⁷ Instead of worrying that their future was being traded away by Stalin, Wettig claims that "there is not the slightest indication that the SED hierarchs were worried by the Soviet initiative, as they would inevitably have been if they had sensed that their position in East Germany might be endangered."³⁸

At the center of scholarly assessment of the Soviet note stand widely differing estimates of whether the conditions obtained in 1952 for a peaceful settlement to the German question that would be palatable to all interested parties. In many ways, the Soviet note has been used by historians as a lens through which to examine questions that cut directly to the heart of Cold War historiography. Did the East-West conflict have to take the shape and intensity that it did? Were there meaningful opportunities to reduce the tensions between East and West? Would an agreement on a neutral Germany provide a positive step toward compromise between the East and West, and stand as a harbinger of better relations in the future? Looking back on these questions with the knowledge that Germany remained divided after 1952 for almost another forty years, it is important to recall that for many citizens residing in both Germanies and in the countries of the two opposing blocs, the division of Germany was an aberrant creation resulting from the breakdown of the Grand Alliance that defeated Nazi Germany. Certainly the question of German unity was one of the ascendant topics in post-war western Germany. With the advantage of historical hindsight, it would be all too easy to unreflectively answer that there was no chance to reduce tensions in the Cold War; history followed its only logical path.

Upon further consideration, however, perhaps such a response is not the product of lack of imagination, but a cool realization that once international systems are established, it is increasingly difficult to imagine how history might have unfolded had other choices been made, or whether any other choices had been possible.³⁹ In the case of post-war Germany, the decisions taken in 1946, with the creation of Bizonia and Secretary Byrne's speech in Stuttgart, the Marshall Plan of 1947, currency reform in 1948, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and many other decisions taken at various levels of the governments in Moscow, Washington, and elsewhere, all combined to form a diminishing universe of viable options for a future peaceful settlement of the German question. In 1952 Europe, the division of Germany had existed for seven years, and regardless of how aberrant this division appeared to contemporaries at the time, a post-war order had becoming increasingly well entrenched; the division of Germany was becoming more fixed and permanent.

In 1952, the Soviet Union was not willing to negotiate sincerely over Germany or repair the rift that divided the European continent. As has been stated above, the Soviet note of March 1952 was not a sincere attempt to reach a settlement offer on Germany, but rather was designed to thwart West German integration into the European Defense Community and topple the Adenauer government. The Soviet Union was firmly committed to its client in East Germany and approved the acceleration of the gradual process of Sovietization of the GDR in 1952. After seven years of increasingly tense relations, the opportunities for compromise were few. In Stalin's last published works, he claimed that British statesman Winston Churchill and his American Allies were unbending, mortal enemies of the Soviet Union and "bear striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends... Other warmongers are American billionaires and millionaires who regard war as a source of profit. These aggressive forces hold in their hands reactionary governments and guide them."⁴⁰ With war raging in Korea and the Western European nations heading toward increased integration, Stalin was not about to abandon any conquests of socialism or put at risk the western border of the empire for which he so assiduously worked. In this context, no conditions obtained in Cold War Europe for a negotiated settlement to the German question. Indeed, the frontier between the East and West in Europe was not "a simple border but a dangerous one."⁴¹

The governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France viewed the Soviet note largely as propaganda aimed at delaying or derailing further military integration of the West, including the Federal Republic. Though western integration was the official policy of the British Foreign Office, the U.S. State Department, and the Quai d'Orsay, there was not unanimous opinion as to how the West should respond to the Soviet note. The United States was interested in convoking a four power conference in order to test Stalin's commitment to hold free all-German elections. Britain and France, with the forceful urging of Adenauer, rejected this course. Over the next half year, a "battle of the notes" ensued which delayed taking action on the Soviet note until the Bonn and Paris treaties were signed in May 1952 ending the occupation of West Germany and incorporating it into the EDC.⁴² An examination of the policies of the three Western powers indicates that in 1952 the conditions did not exist for a peaceful settlement which would allow Germany to be reunited as a neutral nation; Western leaders were not going to exchange the integration of Western Europe for the shadow of German reunification.

American policy toward occupied Germany changed precipitously as Washington came to view its former ally, the Soviet Union, with increased suspicion. Though American diplomats and politicians expressed great trepidation about rehabilitating the newly formed Federal Republic, this concern was balanced by a fear that the nascent state was vulnerable to aggression from an increasingly bellicose Soviet Union. American statesmen sought to prevent the Federal Republic's drifting East, as the Weimar Republic did with the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and Nazi Germany did with the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939, by strengthening the Bonn republic's Western connections and more firmly integrating it into the Western community.⁴³ Although the United States initially rejected France's plan for a European army, viewing it as a futile attempt to rearm

the Germans without rearming Germany, the routing of UN troops in Korea due to Chinese intervention motivated policy makers in Washington to find a quick resolution to rearming the Germans. After the outbreak of war in Korea the United States became firm supporters of the EDC and West German rearmament, viewing both as central to its vision of Europe. According to David Large, American statesmen viewed the EDC as "the fastest way to get the Germans to the front and to solidify the movement for a 'United States of Europe.'"⁴⁴ The United States was committed to the integration of Western Europe and was unwilling to entertain proposals that threatened the coalescence of Western military, political, and economic forces. In addition, the Soviet note arrived just after NATO agreed at Lisbon to expand its conventional force strength. In this context, American statesmen were unwilling to negotiate over Germany, especially when a peace settlement envisioned the Allied withdrawal from Central Europe.⁴⁵ With the impending completion of the EDC treaty and the treaty to end occupation in West Germany, the Truman administration, according to George Kennan, "did not want any agreement with the Soviet government about Germany."⁴⁶

An examination of the diplomatic correspondence of high ranking U.S. diplomats reveals that the United States regarded the Soviet note as an insincere offer aimed at derailing West German integration into the EDC. In correspondence to the High Commissioner for Germany, Secretary of State Dean Acheson claimed that the "next six months and especially [the] next six to ten weeks represent [a] crucial period in our efforts to prevent Sov[iet] manipulation of [the] unity issue from checkmating integration of Federal Republic with [the] West via contractuals and EDC." Acheson continued, "current Soviet proposals and maneuvers are intended solely to obstruct the building of the new Europe and are by no means intended seriously to bring about German reunification on [the] basis of freedom. We must continue to expose [the] insincerity of Sov[iet] proposals."⁴⁷ In correspondence with the embassy in France, Acheson claimed the U.S. should "drive ahead with the signature and ratification of EDC and contractual relations with Germany, and... should not permit the Russians to accomplish their obvious purpose of frustrating both by delay."⁴⁸ In short, the U.S. sought to achieve the following foreign policy goals in Germany:

1. The maintenance of friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the US and the Federal Republic.
2. Continuing and effective participation by the Federal Republic on a basis of equality in the EDC, itself within a developing Atlantic community, and in promotion of the political, economic, and social welfare necessary to a strong and durable Europe.
3. The maintenance of the allied position in Berlin and the political, economic, and psychological strengthening of the western sectors of Berlin.
4. Support of democratic elements in Germany and frustration of the Communist aim to get control of all of Germany.
5. The peaceful unification of all of Germany under conditions of freedom.⁴⁹

As this summation of American foreign policy goals makes plain, the United States was unwilling to seriously negotiate on the status of Germany in 1952. From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy experts in Washington, the conditions did not exist in 1952 in which a peaceful settlement to the German question could have been achieved; Western Germany was of central importance to American foreign policy objectives in Europe in 1952 and American statesmen were unwilling to jeopardize its goals for the unknown of German reunification.

Great Britain, like the United States, came to view the rehabilitation of the Federal Republic as an increasingly important factor in establishing security for Western Europe. Faced with a precarious financial position after World War II and the staggering cost of occupation, Great Britain played a fundamental role in bringing about the division of Germany. According to

John Farquharson, by the end of 1946, British statesmen "were coming around to the belief that the once sought-after goal of treating Germany as an economic whole was for the foreseeable future less desirable than building up the two western zones (Bizonia) into a politically and financially viable unit prior to seeking overall unification."⁵⁰ With the breakdown the Potsdam agreement relating to the principles of economic unity of post-war Germany, the maintenance of the British zone of occupation represented a tremendous burden on the fragile post-war British economy. The British were required to spend precious dollars and further deplete their gold reserves to import food and raw materials from North America in order to feed the Germans residing in the British zone of occupation. Merging their zone of occupation with the American zone provided welcomed relief to the hard-pressed British, because it promised economic recovery of the west that would relieve British taxpayers from shouldering the burden of feeding the Germans. The change in British thinking about post-war Germany is illustrated by two comments separated by three years. In 1946, Prime Minister Attlee stated that "the idea of a division of Germany should be rejected." However, in February 1949, Foreign Secretary Bevin claimed that "the division of Germany, at all events for present, is essential to our plans."⁵¹ Bevin did not mean to imply that Germany would remain permanently divided, but the issue of German reunification would continue for the immediate future. The events of the late 1940s, such as the blockade of Berlin, and the early 1950s, such as the Korean War, resulted in further British support for the continued division of Germany.

Much like their American counterparts, British officials in the Foreign Office viewed the Soviet note as an attempt to thwart western integration. Foreign Secretary Eden believed the "present Soviet initiative should be regarded as [a] reaction to [the] London and Lisbon meetings and as confirming [the] wisdom of our policy on [the] EDC and German contractuals." He continued by stating, the "imminent prospect of Federal Republic integration with [the] West has induced this tactical move designed to disturb Western public opinion and to prevent [the] conclusion and/or ratification of the two agreements."⁵² Eden urged that unless the Soviet note was "handled prudently it may have some attraction for Western public opinion particularly in Germany."⁵³ Although Eden acknowledged that the Soviet note was an "important advance on any offer" previously made by the Soviet Union, there would be too many risks associated with negotiating over a neutral Germany; Eden feared that a neutral Germany could not be trusted, because it could potentially "slide to the East."⁵⁴

Of the three great Western powers, France most vehemently opposed the idea of a remilitarized and reunited Germany. By 1945, German militarism had turned west three times in seventy years, and only in World War I, had the French kept their capital out of German hands. However, changes in the geopolitical landscape made it necessary for Europeans, including the French, to bury the past. This was not an easy process. From the American perspective, the formation of NATO was clearly directed against the Soviet Union. For France, NATO served the purpose of providing a form of double containment, protection from an increasingly bellicose Russian menace, but also checking revanchism in Germany.⁵⁵ Although France opposed German remilitarization, the invasion of Korea in 1950 transformed the inter-Allied discussion about the defense contribution of the FRG from "if" to "how" a rearmed Germany would be integrated into the Atlantic alliance.⁵⁶ "Realizing that his nation's weakness and the continued need for American assistance," Frank Ninkovich contends, "[Premier Rene] Pleven called for the creation of a...single European army composed of mixed contingents which would include German forces."⁵⁷ With the Pleven plan and the Schuman plan, which proposed the European Coal and Steel Community, France was actively, if reluctantly and selectively, contributing to the process of western integration. Now actively engaged with the formation of the EDC, the French would not tolerate any West German attempt to negotiate a settlement that would produce a neutral and unified Germany. In a fall 1951 meeting, French Defense Minister Herve Alphand stated to his West German counterpart that Bonn must not be "taken in by seductive blandishments from the East" aimed at reunification.⁵⁸ Though the EDC plan would be torn asunder by the storm of

French national opinion in 1954, in 1952 western integration was the goal toward which France was working, and as Alphant's comment reveals, German reunification was viewed by France as a dangerous idea; German unity, from the French perspective, would be the seed from which German militarism and revanchism would grow.

Officials in the Quai d'Orsay viewed the Soviet note as troubling. According to the head of the British Foreign Office, Frank Roberts, the Quai d'Orsay feared "that the effect of the Soviet proposals would be to produce a rich and economically strong Germany which would however be militarily dominated by the Soviet Union."⁵⁹ Roberts claimed that the Quai d'Orsay thought the Soviet note was a "dangerous attempt to settle the German question."⁶⁰ From the French perspective, a unified Germany would be able to play West and East off of one another, as the Weimar Republic had in the 1920s. For France, the continued division of Germany served its foreign policy and security interests. In 1952, the French did not support any initiatives that would call into question the status of West Germany, calling into further question scholarly claims that conditions obtained in Europe for a peaceful settlement to the German question that was sufficiently palatable to all interested parties.

Like the three Western occupying powers of Germany, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer viewed the Soviet note as a propaganda ploy aimed at thwarting Western integration and playing on substantial political sentiment in the Federal Republic that supported the reunification of Germany as the highest national priority. Adenauer developed a foreign policy which sought to firmly integrate West Germany into a federation of Western European states, freeing Germany from vacillation between East and West, which had proven to be so disastrous to all of Europe during the first half of the century. Adenauer was concerned that unless the Federal Republic was rehabilitated and attained equal status among the free nations of Europe, a "super Versailles", in which the occupying powers would dictate the terms for a German peace settlement, would be imposed upon the Bonn republic. Adenauer claimed that "the German people were not strong enough - neither politically, militarily, and physically nor mentally and temperamentally - to safeguard a free and independent central position in Europe between the giants in the East and West."⁶¹ German historian Arnulf Baring contends that "Adenauer deceived his own people when he asserted that reunification was the highest goal of his policy... He was the first to perceive that no possibility existed for reunification in freedom and that the neutralization of a reunited Germany would signify political suicide."⁶² Adenauer believed that only from the strength achieved through western integration could Germany find lasting peace. According to Adenauer, the isolation and neutralization of Germany would mean "that Germany, stuck between the two strong power blocs, would finally be pulled into the Russian maelstrom," and "bring free Germany into slavery together with the Eastern zone."⁶³

Adenauer rejected the Soviet note and urged the Western allies not to convoke a four-power conference. Adenauer informed the allied high commissioners on March 11 that the Soviet note would not change his government's policy of pressing ahead with the process of ratifying the EDC and contractual agreements. Adenauer faced, however, a delicate domestic political situation. He sought to continue working toward EDC ratification and the contractual agreements while appearing that he was also working toward the goal of German unity. The SPD, Adenauer's main political opponent, supported the idea that West German participation in the Western alliance system could be exchanged for Soviet concessions which would hasten the return of the Soviet zone and bring about German reunification.⁶⁴ Adenauer responded to the SPD claims by stating that the Soviet note "essentially offers little that is new. Apart from a strong nationalist touch, it advocates the neutralization of Germany and aims to impede progress in creating the European Defense Community and in integrating Europe."⁶⁵ Adenauer stated that when the West was as strong as it could be, stronger than the Soviet government, "then, finally, the world will attain what it has urgently needed during all the previous decades: a long and secure peace!"⁶⁶ It is interesting that in the summer of 1952, only 23 percent of West Germans claimed that reunification was the most important question facing the Federal Republic.⁶⁷ With

Adenauer ascendant on the West German political landscape, and strong public opinion behind him, West Germans pressed forward with their carefully laid plans for western integration into the EDC. Though accusations about missing an opportunity for German unification would follow Adenauer for the rest of his life, he was not about to forego West German security and rehabilitation with the West for the shadow of reunification that provided the nascent republic with no protection from the threat of Soviet expansionism.

The last component of this work will attempt to outline what a unified and neutral Germany would look like within the context of Cold War Europe. To use the Soviet note of March 1952 as a basis from which to speculate about the military, economic, and political character of a reunited Germany is difficult. As has been stated above, this note lacked specific terms outlining what a reunited Germany would look like. Independent, democratic, and peace-loving, terms used in the Soviet note, were defined dramatically different in the East than in the West. Regardless if an independent and democratic Germany was created according to Western definitions, where German politics were pluralistic, its economy capitalistic, and its military subordinated to its civilian government, or according to Soviet understanding, this newly formed nation would exist within a divided Europe. This would position reunited Germany in a highly precarious position, requiring the nascent republic to plan its own defense. It seems most plausible that this defense would be directed against Soviet aggression given the political sentiments of both Adenauer and the SPD leader, Kurt Schumacher, who were both stridently anti-communist. West German public opinion also exhibited significant anti-Soviet sentiments. In July 1952, 66 percent of West Germans felt "menaced by Russia."⁶⁸ That Germans felt vulnerable to Russian attack tapped into deep seated German animosity of the Soviet Union, emphasized by more than a decade of Nazi propaganda which viewed Soviet culture, according to Naimark, as "the low-grade product of inferior Judeo-Bolshevik civilization."⁶⁹ The defense of a reunified and neutral Germany would have to be at least equal to, if not stronger than, the twelve army divisions, 1,300 airplane air force, and 12,000 naval troops envisioned by the EDC.⁷⁰ In addition to requiring a credible conventional forces deterrent, a unified Germany would find it increasingly more difficult not to develop its own nuclear arsenal, with the concomitant destabilizing effects that nuclear proliferation in developing countries caused in the later part of the twentieth century. Germany would be required to direct a significant percentage of its economy to supporting a German defense industry, or acquire the necessary weapons from other countries.

A reunited neutral Germany would be required to establish a sizable defense force at a time of great economic instability. The merging of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic would produce potentially fatal stress on German industry and agriculture. Though 1952 represented in the history of the Bonn republic the front edge of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, 1952 represented a time of desperation in the GDR. As a result of Soviet occupation, East Germany was largely depleted of its industrial capacity, experienced a crisis in agriculture, and lost many of its citizens due to Western immigration. According to Naimark, using Soviet figures on factory removal coupled with Soviet reparations taken from current production "it seems reasonable to conclude that the Soviets had extracted payment of their bill for \$10 billion in reparations by the beginning of the 1950s."⁷¹ Though a reunited Germany could rely on the industrial output of the Ruhr, the desperate economic conditions which would most probably obtain in Germany would likely cause Germany to secede from the European Coal and Steel Community, in order to turn inward and repair its broken economy.

The political climate in which a reunified Germany was required to operate could prove troubling for the newly reunified state. Would the need to build a strong military doom the post-war German state to the same troubles experienced by the Weimar Republic, in which its fledgling democracy was injured by the powerful German General Staff? If neutral Germany fostered a political environment which supported democratic pluralism, would the significant number of German communists still take their direction from Moscow via the Cominform?

Would this open Germany up to threat from within; a threat which could pull Germany into the Soviet orbit? It is not exceedingly far fetched to answer these questions, within the context of 1952 Europe, in the affirmative. It is not at all clear that political extremism would not again rear its ugly head in a Germany faced with the need to establish a new political order and forge a new economy while under heavy pressure to provide for a compelling defense.

Certainly the necessity of German rearmament would encounter significant opposition from the German populace, who resisted the call to German rearmament envisioned by the EDC with the cry "*Ohne Mich!*" (Leave Me Out).⁷² The unfortunate German reputation as inveterate militarists aside, many Germans felt that they and the world were better off without a German army. According to Large, many residents of the Federal Republic felt that, like recovering alcoholics, "the slightest relapse might occasion a full-scale plunge into the old addiction."⁷³ With the wounds of World War II still fresh upon the German (and European) psyche, the need to provide for a strong defense might cause significant social upheaval in the newly formed state.

In the international arena, a reunited Germany would precipitate a Western European arms race. If Germany feared for its defense against possible Soviet attack and built a force strong enough to deter the Soviets from invading Germany, certainly France, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries would have to build up their defenses. During the discussions for EDC, one of the French concerns was the establishment of German armed forces totaling 400,000 men. The French were reluctant to agree to this sizable German force, because it would have made the German army the largest army in Western Europe, due to the fact that a large part of the French army was fighting to keep in line colonial holdings in Algeria and Southeast Asia.⁷⁴ Recollecting the horrors of German occupation during World War II, the Benelux countries insisted that the German military force envisioned as part of the EDC not be larger than its own.⁷⁵ An independent, reunited, and remilitarized Germany would certainly magnify the security concerns of both France and the Benelux countries. The British would also find it difficult to eschew significant rearmament, if they were faced with the developing forces strong enough to deter Soviet aggression in Europe and potential German revanchism in the West. Both France and England would be required to undergo this rearmament during a time in which their economies were floundering, their empires crumbling, and their societies still reeling from the effects of World War II.

A reunited Germany existing within a divided Europe would also bring to the front significant issues for both the United States and the Soviet Union. If Germany was neutral and did not permit the stationing of any foreign troops on its soil, as is called for in the Soviet note of 1952, America's commitment to Europe could change drastically. Would the U.S. military pull back to France or England, if it stayed in Europe at all? What would an independent Germany, pursuing a nationally oriented economic policy, mean for the full economic recovery of Europe? A neutral Germany would greatly interfere with the development of economic, and ultimately political, relations in Western Europe, around which hopes for European recovery had been based.⁷⁶ If reunited Germany were required to build its own defenses, including nuclear weapons, they would most likely cut off Soviet access to East German uranium. This would invariably heighten Soviet anxiety about American nuclear superiority and potentially damage the Soviet ability to successfully enlarge their stockpile of nuclear weapons: an interesting if not tragic irony that German unity would cause geopolitical instability as a result of the Soviets not being able to produce more nuclear weapons. Would the Soviet Union use its considerable conventional forces to find some new sources of uranium outside of Germany? In addition, a united Germany would still exist within a context of divided Europe. It seems highly unlikely given the Cold War atmosphere that had come into being across much of the Northern Hemisphere, that the United States or the Soviet Union would trust Germany to abide by its neutral status and not make common cause with its enemy. The most recent example of collective security, the League of Nations, had proven itself largely unable to remedy the troubles facing Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. From the perspective of the West, a Germany free to

follow in the steps of the Rapallo treaty and the Hitler-Stalin Pact was not one they would abide. Though Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* expected a resurgent Germany to break out of the bonds of its American overlord, thereby indicating that greater tension existed between capitalist countries than between socialist and capitalist countries, a reunited Germany provided Stalin with no security guarantees that a united Germany would not turn its fury in the future to the East.

An examination of newly released information from the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the central archives of the SED in East Berlin reveal that the Soviet note was not a sincere attempt to negotiate a peace settlement aimed at reuniting Germany. The Soviet note was conceived by foreign policy experts in Moscow as a propaganda ploy designed to delay or derail two major Western European and American foreign policy objectives: West German integration into the EDC and the contractual agreement which would end the Federal Republic's occupation status. The Soviet note sought to support those elements in Western Europe that opposed western integration in the hopes of destabilizing West Germany politically and thereby toppling the Adenauer government. Though many scholars, such as Steininger and Phillips, have argued that the Soviet note was a missed opportunity for German reunification, an analysis of recently released documents indicates that there was no missed opportunity; the Soviet note was not a sincere diplomatic endeavor.

The Soviet note could have represented a significant threat to Moscow's East German client, had the note been a sincere attempt to negotiate on the future of Germany. Indeed, historians such as Gaddis, Phillips, and Steininger have claimed that the GDR surely would have been expendable had the Soviet Union been able to realize its vision of a united, neutral, Moscow-friendly Germany. An analysis of newly available evidence suggests that Moscow did not contemplate expending the leadership of the GDR. In fact, an SED controlled Germany was the only form of a united Germany that the Soviets would have abided.

Within the context of a Cold War Europe, the conditions did not obtain in 1952 in which a peace settlement could have been reached over Germany that was sufficiently palatable to the governments of the East and the West. Neither the East nor the West bloc was willing to abandon its part of Germany to the other. Despite rhetoric which espoused false sentiments calling for reunification, the division of Germany played an increasingly important role in the foreign policies of the Western powers and the Soviet Union. In addition, it is highly unlikely that either the East or the West could have built a stable system out of its portion of Europe.⁷⁷ For Germans in the Federal Republic, they were largely unwilling to forego the security and prosperity of western integration for the great unknown of German reunification. Though the division of Europe and the division of Germany seemed like a tragic and unnatural aberration resulting from increased tension between former allies, a neutral, unified Germany, in the context of 1952, was neither desired by the opposing European blocs, nor by the Germans themselves.

The Soviet note of March 1952 provides historians an opportunity to re-examine old questions in light of new evidence. The existing monographic studies of the Soviet note have relied largely on Western sources. Historians could profitably examine the early Cold War period in German history, paying attention to the dynamic relationship between the two German states, as they acted and reacted to one another. The Soviet note also provides historians with a lens through which to re-examine questions which cut to the heart of Cold War historiography. Did the Cold War have to take the path it did? Though eventual understanding of this question may differ only slightly from historians current and provisional knowledge of the Cold War, an examination into the newly opened archives of the countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain will more brightly illuminate how the Cold War took the path it did.

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- ³ Cold War International History Project, *Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 35.
- ⁴ Steininger, *The German Question*, 20, 94.
- ⁵ Ann Phillips, *Soviet Policy Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 115-147.
- ⁶ James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966), 24-36.
- ⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 127.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ M. Gribanov to A. Gromyko, 24 Feb. 1951, Arkhiv vnesnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), 082, 38, 112, 250:387/Zeo as quoted in Gerhard Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification: Archival Evidence on Soviet Foreign Policy in Spring 1952," *The Historical Journal* 37, 2 (1994), 413. The first name of Mr. Gribanov is not provided in Wettig's article.
- ¹⁰ Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 134-35
- ¹¹ Ruud van Dijk, "The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for German Unification?" CWIHP Working Paper #14 (May 1996), 25.
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- ¹³ M. Gribanov to A. Vyshinskii, 15 Aug. 1951, AVPRF, 082,38,112, 250: 1558/Zeo, as quoted in Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification," 413.
- ¹⁴ *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. VII, 169, footnote #2.
- ¹⁵ Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification," 414.
- ¹⁶ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 127.
- ¹⁷ Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification," 415.
- ¹⁸ Gromyko to Stalin, 25 Jan. 1952, AVPRF, 082, 40, 11, 225: 101a/Ge. as quoted in Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification," 417.
- ¹⁹ Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification," 416.
- ²⁰ Van Dijk, "The 1952 Stalin Note Debate," 8; Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 137; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 127.
- ²¹ Steininger, *The German Question*, 6.
- ²² Wilfried Loth, "Traeume vom Deutschen Reich," *Die Zeit*, October 12, 1984, as quoted in Steininger, *The German Question*, 6.
- ²³ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 128.
- ²⁴ R.C. Raack, "Stalin Plans his Post-War Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28 (1993): 53.
- ²⁵ Van Dijk, "The 1952 Stalin Note Debate," 23.
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- ²⁷ Raack, "Stalin Plans his Post-War Germany," 62.
- ²⁸ Dietrich Staritz, "The SED, Stalin, and the German Question: Interests and Decisions in Light of New Sources," *German History* 10, no. 3 (1992): 281.
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- ³¹ Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 135.
- ³² Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification," 417.
- ³³ Staritz, "The SED, Stalin, and the German Question," 285.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 286.
- ³⁵ Minutes, Stalin conversation with Pieck, Ulbricht, and Grotewohl, 7. Apr. 1952, Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, in CWIHP *Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 48.

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- ⁴³ David C. Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 2-3.
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- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 331.
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- ⁵⁷ Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States*, 87.
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- ⁵⁹ Steininger, *The German Question*, 53.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 53.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 22.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 23.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 27.
- ⁶⁴ Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States*, 95.
- ⁶⁵ Steininger, *The German Question*, 24.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁶⁷ Elisabeth Noelle and Erich P. Neumann, eds., *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-66* (Allensbach: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1967), 459.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 553. Fifteen percent did not feel menaced, while nineteen percent had no opinion.
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